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a b s t r a c t 
With the popularization of ride-sharing services, drivers working as freelancers on ride- 
sharing platforms can design their schedules ﬂexibly. They make daily decisions regard- 
ing whether to participate in work, and if so, how many hours to work. Factors such as 
hourly income rate affect both the participation decision and working-hour decision, and 
evaluation of the impacts of hourly income rate on labor supply becomes important. In 
this paper, we propose an econometric framework with closed-form measures to estimate 
both the participation elasticity (i.e., extensive margin elasticity) and working-hour elas- 
ticity (i.e., intensive margin elasticity) of labor supply. We model the sample self-selection 
bias of labor force participation and endogeneity of income rate and show that failure to 
control for sample self-selection and endogeneity leads to biased estimates. Taking advan- 
tage of a natural experiment with exogenous shocks on a ride-sharing platform, we iden- 
tify the driver incentive called “income multiplier” as exogenous shock and an instrumen- 
tal variable. We empirically analyze the impacts of hourly income rates on labor supply 
along both extensive and intensive margins. We ﬁnd that both the participation elasticity 
and working-hour elasticity of labor supply are positive and signiﬁcant in the dataset of 
this ride-sharing platform. Interestingly, in the presence of driver heterogeneity, we also 
ﬁnd that in general participation elasticity decreases along both the extensive and inten- 
sive margins, and working-hour elasticity decreases along the intensive margin. 
© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
With the rapid development and popularization of mobile and wireless communication technologies, ride-sharing plat- 
forms such as Didi Chuxing and Uber, which use mobile wireless technology to connect passengers and drivers, are disrup- 
tively changing the transportation industry. In the traditional taxi business, drivers are normally required to obtain an occu- 
pational license, or “medallion,” in order to provide transport service to passengers. The number of taxi drivers is limited by 
the number of medallions issued, the regions in which drivers can pick up passengers are restricted to the jurisdiction that 
issued medallion, and fares are often set by regulatory bodies ( Cramer and Krueger, 2016 ). In ride-sharing markets, drivers 
working as freelancers can design their schedules more ﬂexibly, which implies that they can use their own or leased cars 
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to offer transport service whenever and wherever they choose. As ride requests arrive, the platforms match these requests 
with nearby drivers and adjust fares dynamically when demand is high relative to the supply of drivers in a local region. 
A driver’s income depends on his/her working time and location, other drivers’ supply, and passenger demand ( Chen et al., 
2017 ). Because drivers are autonomous, they are able to adjust labor supply in response to income ﬂuctuations. 
Ride-sharing platforms lean heavily on payments to boost driver income in the presence of ﬂexible labor supply, so 
evaluation of the impacts of income rate on labor supply becomes important. For example, Uber offers a driver $500 for 
completing 120 trips in a week or a guaranteed income of $1800 for the ﬁrst 200 trips. More recently, Uber’s new incentive, 
“Boost,” multiplies the driver’s trip fare by a certain amount for all trips within a speciﬁed hotspot during speciﬁed times 1 . 
On the driver side, incentive payments may represent between 20% and 40% of a typical driver’s income, according to an 
analysis conducted by Los Angeles-based Uber driver Harry Campbell, who runs the popular blog The Rideshare Guy. On the 
platform side, driver incentive payments were one of Uber’s biggest operational expenses for the six quarters that ended in 
the ﬁrst half of 2017 ( Bensinger, 2017 ). 
Motivation . Investigating the effect of hourly income rates on labor supply for ride-sharing platforms is challenging. As 
suggested by standard labor economics theory, income rates exert two distinct effects on labor supply by inﬂuencing two 
margins: one is intensive, and relates to the number of hours worked; the other is extensive, and relates to the decision to 
participate or not in the labor market ( Cahuc et al., 2014 ). For nearly 20 years, labor economists have been debating on how 
cabdrivers decide how long to work ( Scheiber, 2016 ). Colin Camerer, a behavioral economist, ﬁnds a negative relationship 
between hours supplied of New York City cabdrivers and transitory changes in wages, and argues that drivers come into the 
market with an income target and quit working once they reach that target ( Camerer et al., 1997 ). In contrast, Henry Farber 
ﬁnds that taxi drivers tend to respond positively to increases in earnings opportunities and the estimated elasticities are 
generally positive ( Farber, 2015 ). From the perspective of research design for observational studies, the endogeneity problem 
could bias estimation of the effect. On one hand, drivers on ride-sharing platforms face a two-step decision: Whether to 
participate in work, and if so, how many hours to work. However, only historical data for participating drivers is available, 
which indicates that data on working hours is censored. Since unobservable factors affect both the participation decision and 
working-hour decision, ﬁtting on the nonrandomly selected samples would lead to sample selection bias ( Heckman, 1979 ) 2 . 
On the other hand, drivers’ working hours are not determined right after obtaining ﬁxed income rates, because the hours 
worked affect the income rates. This simultaneity bias creates an endogeneity problem in model identiﬁcation. Moreover, ex- 
tensive empirical works have sought to analyze labor supply using observed hourly income rates calculated by dividing total 
daily income by total hours worked, which introduces measurement error . This will induce a negative correlation between 
calculated hourly income rates and hours worked. 
Research questions . Motivated by these challenges in evaluating the impacts of income rate on labor supply on ride- 
sharing platforms, we seek to answer the following research questions: (i) Methodologically, how can we analyze the inﬂu- 
ence of income rates on overall labor supply while controlling for sample self-selection, endogeneity of the income rate, and 
measurement error in working hours? (ii) What is the importance of income-targeting behavior to overall labor supply as a 
function of daily participation and daily hours worked? (iii) How would this inﬂuence be affected by driver heterogeneity? 
Methodology . To answer these questions, we ﬁrst discuss a labor supply model with decisions on daily hours worked on 
the basis of the reference-dependent preference theory, which predicts the sign of the intensive margin elasticity of labor 
supply. Next, we propose an econometric approach to estimate the impact of income rates on daily labor supply response 
on both the extensive and intensive margins, which can accommodate both sample selection of labor force participation and 
endogeneity of income rate. In particular, we use an instrumental variable approach to address potential omitted variable 
bias and simultaneity bias issues. Finally, our empirical framework is applied to data from Didi Chuxing, which is the leading 
ride-sharing platform in China. Importantly, we take advantage of the driver “income multiplier” as the exogenous shock in 
a large-scale natural experiment to help us avoid the endogeneity problem in model identiﬁcation. After classifying drivers 
by their extensive and intensive margins of labor supply, we present the participation elasticity and working-hour elasticity 
in the presence of driver heterogeneity. 
Results . Our empirical analysis of labor supply reveals two key ﬁndings. First, using the dataset from a ride-sharing 
platform, we ﬁnd that participation elasticity ranges from 0.107 to 0.524, and working-hour elasticity ranges from 0.023 to 
1.037; both estimates are positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero. The results do not completely exclude the possible 
existence of drivers income-targeting behavior. They imply that, when the average driver makes daily labor supply deci- 
sion with the practical income levels in our dataset, the behavior forces in favor of neoclassical intertemporal substitution 
outweigh the forces that work based on income targets. Second, in the presence of driver heterogeneity, we ﬁnd that in gen- 
eral participation elasticity decreases along both the extensive and intensive margins, and working-hour elasticity decreases 
along the intensive margin. Our results also reveal that labor supply elasticity is affected by driver gender and age. 
Main contributions . The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows: 
• We propose an econometric framework with closed-form measures to estimate participation elasticity (i.e., extensive 
margin elasticity) and working-hour elasticity (i.e., intensive margin elasticity) of labor supply. We estimate the effects of 
income rates on total labor supply on ride-sharing platforms and use a framework that models the sample self-selection 
1 https://www.uber.com/en-AU/drive/resources/boost/ . 
2 In this paper, we use “sample selection bias” and “sample self-selection bias” interchangeably. 
78 H. Sun, H. Wang and Z. Wan / Transportation Research Part B 125 (2019) 76–93 
bias of labor force participation and simultaneity bias of working hours. We believe that the proposed framework can 
also be applied to analyze the labor supply of other on-demand platforms with independent agents. 
• We build a natural experiment environment in which the platform implements adjustment of driver incentive as ex- 
ogenous shocks. The incentive which is referred to as “income multiplier” in this paper multiplies drivers’ trip fare by 
a certain amount for all trips during speciﬁed times in a day. In our identiﬁcation approach, the exogenous income 
multiplier is adopted as an instrumental variable to address the simultaneity bias problem. 
• We provide empirical evidence on labor supply elasticity on ride-sharing platforms, which is positive in all groups of 
drivers in the data of this ride-sharing platform. Our work also highlights the importance of driver heterogeneity to 
the impacts of income rates on labor supply for ride-sharing platforms. Participation elasticity decreases along both the 
extensive and intensive margins; working-hour elasticity decreases along the intensive margin. 
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 , we discuss the related literature. In Section 3 , we introduce a 
model of drivers’ labor supply based on the reference-dependent theory. In Section 4 , we propose the methodology to model 
drivers’ self-selection of participation and treatment endogeneity of working hours, and present closed-form expressions to 
estimate participation elasticity and working-hour elasticity. In Section 5 , we describe our dataset and introduce the natural 
experiment. In Section 6 , we present estimation results for labor supply elasticity in different groups of drivers. Finally, in 
Section 7 , we summarize our main insights and discuss directions for future research. 
2. Related literature 
Our work connects two strands of previous research. The ﬁrst is the empirical analysis of daily labor supply of workers 
who can decide whether to participate or choose the number of hours they work ﬂexibly. Table 1 summarizes prior studies 
on the following six aspects: labor markets where both income levels and the quantity of labor supplied are varied each 
day, labor supply responses along both extensive and intensive margins, theoretical background, data sources, identiﬁcation 
approaches to address endogeneity issues, and estimates of labor supply elasticities. Three important differences distinguish 
our research from these early studies. First, based on a large dataset from a ride-sharing platform, we conduct a complete 
analysis of drivers’ labor supply responses to changes in income opportunities, including responses in daily working hours 
and responses in number of days worked (daily participation margin). Second, we propose a causal inference method to 
control for sample self-selection bias due to participation decision and endogeneity of daily hours worked. Closest to our 
paper, Stafford (2015) estimates income elasticities of participation and daily working hours using a framework that deals 
with sample self-selection bias and endogeneity of income rates, where the moon phase is used as an instrument for hourly 
income rates of commercial trap ﬁshermen in the two-stage least squares (2SLS) in order to remove bias due to endogeneity 
of the wage. In our work, we take advantage of a natural experiment to create exogenous shocks, and instrument the en- 
dogenous hourly income rates of drivers with the driver incentive income multiplier that is uncorrelated with measurement 
error. Third, taking drivers’ heterogeneity into consideration, we present the labor supply elasticities for diverse types of 
drivers. Comparison of elasticity estimates across different groups provides additional implications of labor supply behavior 
on a ride-sharing platform. 
Another strand is staﬃng and pricing for shared transportation platforms. Representative works include ( Cachon et al., 
2017; Taylor, 2018; Bai et al., 2018 ). These papers focus on agents’ rational decisions without considering reference- 
dependent preferences. Zha et al. (2017) propose equilibrium models to characterize the labor supply (i.e., working hours) of 
drivers. Because of competing theories regarding how a driver determines his/her working hours, they present equilibrium 
models with neoclassical or income-targeting hypotheses. Our empirical analysis using data from the largest ride-sharing 
platform in China provides evidence that when the average driver makes daily labor supply decision on ride-sharing plat- 
forms, the behavior forces in favor of neoclassical intertemporal substitution outweigh the forces that work based on income 
targets. Similar conclusions are also reached in Fehr and Goette (2007) , Stafford (2015) and Giné et al. (2017) . 
3. The labor supply model 
3.1. Optimal decisions on hours worked with income targeting 
This section introduces a theoretical model of drivers’ labor supply based on income targets. We consider their deci- 
sions of hours worked on a given day (also see Crawford and Meng, 2011; Farber, 2015; Zha et al., 2017 ). According to the 
reference-dependent preference model proposed by K ˝oszegi and Rabin (2006) and Farber (2015) , given hourly income rate 
W in the platforms, a driver’s utility of working hours H (also called “hours worked” in this paper) is the sum of positive 
utility from his/her income earned I = W H and disutility from hours worked that day. Suppose that a driver sets a daily 
income target T ; then his/her utility function can be speciﬁed as follows: 
U(I, H) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
(1 + α)(I − T ) − θ
1 + ηh 
H 1+ ηh , if I < T , 
(1 − α)(I − T ) − θ
1 + ηh 
H 1+ ηh , if I ≥ T , 
(1) 
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Table 1 
Empirical analysis of the daily labor supply of ﬂexible workers in literature. 
Labor Market Labor Supply Theory Data Identiﬁcation Elasticity 
Taxicab drivers 
( Camerer et al., 1997 ) 
Hours worked Reference- dependent 
preference 
Trip sheets of NYC 
cabdrivers (1988,1990,1994) 
Average income as IV Negative hours elas. 
(-0.355 ∼ -0.618) 
Taxicab drivers 
( Chou, 2002 ) 
Hours worked Reference- dependent 
preference 
Survey of Singapore taxi 
drivers 
Average income as IV Negative hours elas. 
(-0.3 ∼ -0.9) 
Bicycle messengers 
( Fehr and Goette, 2007 ) 
Hours worked, effort per 
hour 
Reference- dependent 
preference 
Number of shifts and 
revenues per shift 
RCT Negative effort elas. (-0.24), 
Positive hours elas. 
(1.34 ∼1.50) 
Workers on the 
Trans-Alaska pipeline 
( Carrington, 1996 ) 
Participation, hours worked Neoclassical intertemporal 
labor supply 
Unemployment insurance 
reports 
Temporary demand shocks 
as IV 
Positive participation elas. 
(0.738), Positive hours elas. 
(0.583) 
Baseball stadium vendors 
( Oettinger, 1999 ) 
Participation Marginal analysis Participation and income Demand shifter as IV Positive participation elas. 
(0.6) 
Taxicab drivers 
( Farber, 2015 ) 
Hours worked Neoclassical intertemporal 
labor supply 
Trip sheets of NYC 
cabdrivers (2009 ∼2013) 
Average income as IV Positive hours elas. 
(0.36 ∼0.62) 
Commercial trap ﬁshermen 
( Stafford, 2015 ) 
Participation, hours worked Neoclassical intertemporal 
labor supply 
Marine Fisheries trip ticket Moon phase as IV, 
selectivity correction 
Positive participation elas. 
(0.062 ∼0.066), Positive 
hours elas. (1.05 ∼ 1.26) 
South Indian boat owners 
( Giné et al., 2017 ) 
Participation Neoclassical intertemporal 
labor supply 
Sales and loan transactions Demand shifter as IV, 
selectivity correction 
Positive participation elas. 
(0.8 ∼1.3), Negative 
participation elas. on 
accum. income. (-0.05 ∼
- 0.007) 
Drivers in a ride-sharing 
ﬁrm ( Sheldon, 2016 ) 
Hours worked Neoclassical intertemporal 
labor supply 
Trip, hourly activity Average income as IV Positive hours elas. 
(0.13 ∼0.25) 
Uber drivers ( Angrist et al., 
2017 ) 
Participation, weekly hours 
worked 
Neoclassical intertemporal 
labor supply 
RCT Incentive offer as IV Almost zero participation 
elas., positive hours elas. 
(1.2) 
(a) Abbreviations : IV, instrumental variable(s); RCT, randomized controlled trial; elas., elasticity; NYC, New York City; accum., (weekly) accumulated. (b) Probability of stopping : Farber (2005) 
analyzes stopping behavior of New York City cabdrivers and shows that the likelihood of quitting for the day is positively related to the number of hours already worked. Crawford and 
Meng (2011) further reconciles the ﬁnding. 
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where parameter α ≥0 represents the change in marginal utility at the income target T, θ ≥0 controls the disutility from 
hours worked, and ηh ∈ R is related to the income rate elasticity of labor supply along intensive margin. The utility with 
reference-dependent preferences is based on a neoclassical utility function ((I − T ) − θ1+ ηh H 
1+ ηh ) augmented with a gain- 
loss utility ±α(I − T ) around the reference point T . To see this, when α = 0 , U ( I, H ) is the neoclassical utility function and 
the optimal working hours are 
H ∗0 = 
(
W 
θ
) 1 
ηh 
, (2) 
which implies that the intensive margin elasticity of labor supply is 1 ηh 
. Taking reference-dependent preferences into con- 
sideration ( α> 0), drivers decide their optimal working hours by maximizing the utility function in Eq. (1) , which gives the 
following optimal solution: 
H ∗ = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩ 
(
(1 + α) W 
θ
)
1 
ηh , if W < 
(
θ
1+ α
)
1 
1+ ηh T 
ηh 
1+ ηh , 
T 
W 
, if 
(
θ
1+ α
)
1 
1+ ηh T 
ηh 
1+ ηh < W < 
(
θ
1 −α
)
1 
1+ ηh T 
ηh 
1+ ηh , (
(1 − α) W 
θ
)
1 
ηh , if W > 
(
θ
1 −α
)
1 
1+ ηh T 
ηh 
1+ ηh 
(3) 
The Eq. (3) on the optimal working hours shows that when the income rates are very low, the working hours required 
to achieve the income target are so high that disutility from hours worked is higher than the positive utility from in- 
come earned. Hence the optimal working hours are less than T W and satisfy the condition that marginal utility from con- 
sumption is equal to the marginal utility from working. For intermediate income rates, drivers choose their working hours 
such that their total income is equal to their target, and the range of income rates in which a driver is a target earner 
is 
(
( θ1+ α ) 
1 
1+ ηh T 
ηh 
1+ ηh , ( θ1 −α ) 
1 
1+ ηh T 
ηh 
1+ ηh 
)
. If α is close to zero, which implies little gain-loss utility, the range becomes very 
small, and the reference-dependent preference (or income target) is not important for labor supply. When income rates 
are suﬃciently high, the working hours required to achieve the income target are so low that it is optimal to work longer 
( H ∗ > T W ). 
Under the optimal working hours in Eq. (3) , the intensive margin elasticity of labor supply is: 
η = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
−1 , if 
(
θ
1+ α
)
1 
1+ ηh T 
ηh 
1+ ηh < W < 
(
θ
1 −α
)
1 
1+ ηh T 
ηh 
1+ ηh , 
1 
ηh 
, otherwise . 
(4) 
The reference-dependent model predicts that when income levels are intermediate, it is optimal for drivers to stop work- 
ing upon reaching the income target. Under this circumstance, the income rate elasticity of labor supply at the intensive 
margin is close to −1; therefore, labor supply will decrease if the platform offers higher income rates to drivers. 
3.2. Discussion of the labor supply model: the importance of the extensive margin 
The above labor supply model with income targeting predicts the sign or magnitude of income rate elasticity at the 
intensive margin. However, one important motivation for our research is to understand the effects of income rates on labor 
supply along the extensive margin involved in drivers’ participation decisions each day. Since the hourly income rate in 
ride-sharing markets ﬂuctuates temporarily, both the probability of participation and daily hours worked can vary. This is 
because drivers increase their leisure time and non-market work when hourly income rates are relatively low, and reduce 
leisure and non-market work when hourly income rates are relatively high ( Lucas Jr and Rapping, 1969 ). 
From the perspective of operational practices, understanding labor supply on the extensive margin (or the number of 
active drivers) is relevant to the development of ride-sharing platforms. Because these platforms offer a ﬂexible schedule 
with low barriers to entry, once potential drivers qualify to work on the platforms, they are free to spend as many or as 
few days as they like offering their transport services to passengers. A large number of drivers try ride-sharing services; 
some stop after a period of time, and others continue indeﬁnitely. Taking Uber as an example, when UberX was launched, 
the exponential growth in the number of active Uber drivers in the United States from mid-2012 to late 2014 demonstrated 
that the advent of Uber had provided new opportunities to a large and growing segment of the labor force 3 In addition, 
predictors of the growth in the number of Uber drivers across cities, such as city population, also provide insights into the 
forces underlying Uber’s success ( Hall and Krueger, 2018 ). 
From the perspective of market design, a two-sided matching market needs to provide thickness ( Roth, 2018 ). Bringing 
a large enough number of active drivers (i.e., high extensive margin) can help make the ride-sharing market thick, which 
would produce satisfactory outcomes for the service, such as high matching eﬃciency, low proportion of unsatisﬁed pas- 
senger requests, and short passenger waiting time before pickup. 
3 Active drivers provided at least four trips to passengers in a given month ( Hall and Krueger, 2018 ). 
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From the perspective of labor supply theory, the distinction between the extensive and intensive margins of labor supply 
has long been recognized in microeconometric studies ( Blundell et al., 2011 ). The standard labor economics theory illus- 
trates that income rates exert two distinct effects on labor supply by inﬂuencing intensive margins and extensive extensive 
( Cahuc et al., 2014 ). By splitting the labor supply behavior of drivers into participation in work and the intensity of work 
supplied by those participants, we can obtain a coherent picture of the impacts of hourly income rates on total labor supply. 
Importantly, estimates of the elasticity of labor supply based on micro data can be understated due to failure to account 
for the extensive margin (participation decisions) ( Rogerson, 1988 ). Due to the important role of the extensive margin, we 
propose a method to model drivers’ labor force participation decisions in the next section. 
4. Modeling the self-selection of labor force participation and endogeneity of income rate 
4.1. Methodological implications of self-selection and endogeneity 
Since drivers self-select into the participation strategies appropriate to their own contexts, an empirical model that 
does not account for sample self-selection bias could be misspeciﬁed, and the elasticity estimates and normative con- 
clusions drawn from such analysis could be misleading. Motivated by the income selectivity bias problem introduced by 
Gronau (1974) , we model drivers’ self-selection using the sample selection model proposed by Heckman (1976) , describe 
drivers’ two-step labor supply decision at the extensive and intensive margins, and adopt instrumental variables for the 
endogenous variable. 
4.1.1. Modeling self-selection of labor force participation 
On ride-sharing platforms, drivers face a two-step decision: (1) whether to participate in work, and (2) if so, how many 
hours to work. Consider a random sample of I drivers. Let W it denote driver i ’s actual income rate on a given day t . Let 
W 0 
it denote driver i ’s reservation income rate on a given day t , which is unobservable for the platform. Let W 
∗
it denote an 
index of labor force attachment, which in the absence of ﬁxed costs of work may be interpreted as the difference be- 
tween income rates W it and W 
∗
it , i.e., W 
∗
it = W it −W 0 it ( Gronau, 1974; Heckman, 1976 ). According to the analysis of labor- 
force participation in Gronau (1974) , a job hunter decides on an income rate W it to distinguish between those income 
offers he accepts and those he rejects. Let W 0 
it denote the job seeker’s price of time at home, he rejects an income offer 
that falls short of W 0 
it . In our problem, a driver does not participate in work on days when market hourly income rate W it 
is lower than W 0 
it , i.e., W it ≤ W 0 it . W ∗it is unobservable , but both driver i ’s participation decision Y it ∈ {0, 1} and the hours 
worked H it on day t are observable . Speciﬁcally, we specify driver i ’s participation decision using an indicator function (i.e., 
1 = “participation” and 0 = “no participation”). Then labor supply of driver i on day t can be speciﬁed by the following 
equations: 
Y it = I { W ∗it > 0 } , (5) 
W ∗it = X 1 i β1 + it , (6) 
H it = X 2 i β2 + ε it , (7) 
where X 1 i and X 2 i are vectors of independent variables, including hourly income rate W it . β1 and β2 are vectors of pa- 
rameters, and  it and εit are error terms that capture the effects that cannot be identiﬁed or measured. We assume that 
E [ it ] = 0 and E [ ε it ] = 0 . The covariance of random terms for a driver i is E [ it ε it ] = σ12 . As a consequence of a random 
sampling scheme, we have E [ it ε i ′ t ] = 0 for different drivers i  = i ′ ( Heckman, 1979 ). 
Since data for working hours H it are available only if the corresponding participation decision Y it = 1 , the population 
regression function of the hours worked for the subsample of available data is 
E [ H it | X 2 i , participation decision strategy ] = X 2 i β2 + E [ ε it | participation decision strategy ] 
= X 2 i β2 + E [ ε it | X 2 i , it > −X 1 i β1 ] . (8) 
If εit is independent of  it , which implies that the driver’s participation decision and hours worked are independent, the 
conditional mean of εit is zero and Eq. (8) is reduced to 
E [ H it | X 2 i , participation decision strategy ] = X 2 i β2 + E [ ε it | participation decision strategy ] 
= X 2 i β2 . (9) 
For example, New York City cabdrivers work on almost all days due to their contracting requirements ( Farber, 2015 ), 
so the participation decision strategy can be ignored and their decisions are only evidenced by the number of hours they 
work each day based on the income rate ﬂuctuation. On ride-sharing platforms, drivers working as freelancers can design 
their schedules more ﬂexibly, and some factors can affect both their participation decision and hours worked. For example, 
consider an exogenous shock that reduces a driver’s price of time at home (e.g., a negative shock to household employment 
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( Stafford, 2015 )). Such a shock can render a driver more likely to participate and more likely to work longer hours for any 
given hourly income rate. Therefore, the conditional mean of εit is nonzero and the regression estimates for parameters in 
Eq. (7) ﬁt on the nonrandomly selected samples. Omitting the conditional mean as a regressor will lead to the problem of 
sample selection bias . 
To address this sample self-selection problem, we construct a Heckman sample selection model to correct selec- 
tion bias ( Heckman, 1976; Cameron and Trivedi, 2005 ). Assume that  it and εit follow a bivariate normal distribution 
N (0 , 0 , σ 2  , σ 2 ε , ρ) . In practice, labor force attachment W ∗it is unobservable, but the parameters of the probability that a driver 
chooses to participate can be estimated by using probit analysis for the full sample. The speciﬁcation of a probit model to 
describe the participation decision becomes: 
P 
[ 
Y it = 1 | X i 
] 
= 	( X 1 i β1 ) , (10) 
where the standard deviation σ  of  it is normalized to be 1, and 	 and φ are the cumulative density function and proba- 
bility density function of the standard normal distribution, respectively. 
Let H itj represent the working hours of driver i on day t corresponding to the participation decision j , where j = 1 rep- 
resents the driver’s decision to participate and j = 0 represents the driver’s decision to not participate. Accounting for the 
nonzero covariances arising out of unobserved factors that affect both the participation (i.e., selection) and hours worked 
(i.e., outcome) equations above, the expected working hours of drivers that participate in work can be respeciﬁed as 
E [ H it1 | j = 1] = X 2 i β21 + ρσε φ( X 1 i β1 ) 
	( X 1 i β1 ) 
. (11) 
Similarly, the expected working hours of drivers that choose not to participate can be respeciﬁed as 
E [ H it0 | j = 0] = X 2 i β20 − ρσε φ( X i α) 
1 − 	( X i α) 
. (12) 
These two equations state that the expected hours worked are structured as the sum of two components: The ﬁrst com- 
ponent, called common features , represents the effects of independent variables that inﬂuence the length of time worked, 
with different coeﬃcients for drivers participating on the platform and drivers that do not participate. The second com- 
ponent, called heterogeneous features , which differs in the two equations, represents the inﬂuence of the expected value of 
the error terms εit 1 and εit 0 given the truncation in  it . The truncated density of the error term  i owing to the selection 
is known as the inverse Mills ratio, which is calculated from the Selection Equation as φ( X 1 i β1 ) / 	( X 1 i β1 ) for drivers that 
participate and as φ( X 1 i β1 ) / (1 − 	( X 1 i β1 )) for drivers that do not participate. The inverse Mills ratio terms capture the 
role of unobserved contextual factors that affect both the participation decision and working hours, given the self-selection 
into a participation decision. ρ  = 0 indicates the presence of endogeneity and ρ = 0 indicates that the participation decision 
is exogenous and independent of working hours. 
Outcome Eq. (11) for drivers that choose to participate implies that when drivers are randomly assigned to the partic- 
ipation option, the average working hours are X 2 i β21 . However, when drivers self-select themselves into the participation 
option, the average working hours are given by X 2 i β21 + ρσε φ( X 1 i β1 ) / 	( X 1 i β1 ) . If ρσε φ( X 1 i β1 ) / 	( X 1 i β1 ) > 0 , we have 
E [ H it1 | j = 1] > X 2 i β21 , which means that the working hours of drivers that choose to participate are above average working 
hours. In this case, the presence of unobserved characteristics will not only inﬂuence selection into the participation option, 
but also enable working hours to be above average. 
Outcome Eq. (12) for drivers choosing nonparticipation suggests that when drivers are randomly assigned to the partic- 
ipation option, the average working hours are X 2 i β20 . However, when drivers self-select into the nonparticipation option, 
the average working hours are given by X 2 i β20 − ρσε φ( X i α) / (1 − 	( X i α)) . When ρσε φ( X i α) / (1 − 	( X i α)) > 0 , we have 
E [ H it0 | j = 0] < X 2 i β20 , which suggests that the presence of unobserved characteristics will then enable working hours of 
nonparticipants to be below average if they had worked. 
4.1.2. Modeling the endogeneity of income rate 
The total service time supplied by each driver on each day depends on both the participation decision and the choice 
of working hours. Meanwhile, the hourly income rate is also determined by the aggregate service time supplied by all 
participating drivers, which indicates a reverse causality between working hours and hourly income rate. Since both supply 
and demand curves shift from time to time, any simple regression of working hours on hourly income rate will not yield 
a consistent estimate of the labor supply pattern in general. In addition, while we can use our historical dataset to adjust 
for heterogeneous driver characteristics in our model, it is possible there are unobservable factors that inﬂuence both the 
income rates and labor supply, which can also lead to biased inferences when ignoring this potential source of endogeneity. 
Obtaining consistent estimates requires instrumental variable-type estimation. An instrumental variable (IV) approach 
aims to purify the independent variable by stripping out the nonstochastic element. In principle, an IV should predict the 
endogenous variable of interest but is uncorrelated with the dependent variable. While IV can be effective at removing 
endogeneity bias, problems can arise if the IV is not strongly correlated with the endogenous variable. If an instrument is 
weak, the conﬁdence intervals formed using the asymptotic distribution for two-stage least squares may be misleading, and 
IV estimates can be biased in the same way OLS estimates are biased ( Bound et al., 1995 ). Additionally, IV estimates based 
on weak instruments are highly sensitive to small violations of the exclusion restriction ( Small and Rosenbaum, 2008 ). 
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Valid IVs usually come from natural experiments or exogenous shocks. In our problem, to instrument the endogenous 
variable hourly income rate , we exploit the fact that some income adjustments could be suitable IVs because they are exoge- 
nously related to the hourly income rate and unrelated to the hours worked. In addition, exogenous demand shifters, such 
as the number of potential passenger requests, could also be used as instruments for observed hourly income rate. We will 
discuss the speciﬁc choice of IVs in our setting in Section 5 . 
Given valid IVs, a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis can be applied to jointly estimate the endogenous 
hourly income rate with its instruments and all other control variables ( Stage 1), and the main dependent variable hours 
worked with the puriﬁed independent variable and all other control variables ( Stage 2) ( Durbin, 1954 ). Consider the following 
linear regression model with the endogenous regressor hourly income rate : 
H it = X 2 i β2 + W it β2 w + ε it , (13) 
where W it is correlated with εit and this correlation generates the endogeneity problem. Let Z t be an IV (or IVs as a vector) 
and γ t its parameter. Z t is uncorrelated with εit , i.e., Cov (Z t , ε it ) = 0 . In the ﬁrst stage of the estimation procedure, the 
instrument equation is 
W it = X 2 i β3 + Z t γt + νt , (14) 
where νt is a random error term. In the second stage, the predicted values ˆ W it of W it are plugged into Eq. (13) , and we 
obtain the causal regression model 
H it = X 2 i β2 + ˆ W it β2 w + ε it . (15) 
Eq. (15) implies that the only reason for the relationship between hourly income rate W it and IV Z t is the ﬁrst-stage in- 
strument equation, while the instrument (vector) has no effect on hours worked other than through the ﬁrst-stage channel. 
4.2. Model of labor supply elasticity on a ride-sharing platform 
Drivers’ working decisions on a ride-sharing platform include not only whether to participate, but also how many hours 
to work on a given day. By Eqs. (5) –(7) , let random variables Y and H be a driver’s participation decision and hours worked, 
respectively. The total labor supply S of a driver is: 
S = E [ Y × H] 
= P [ Y = 1] E [ Y × H| Y = 1] + P [ Y = 0] E [ Y × H| Y = 0] , (16) 
where P [ Y = 0] E [ Y × H| Y = 0] = 0 . Eq. (16) shows that the total number of hours worked of each driver can be decom- 
posed into an extensive component P [ Y = 1] and an intensive component E [ Y × H| Y = 1] , where the extensive margin 
of labor supply is deﬁned as the days that the driver chooses to participate (this decomposition has also been used in 
Blundell et al. (2013) .) 
Let W denote the income rate. The aggregate income elasticity of total labor supply can be deﬁned as 
η = ∂S/S 
∂W/W 
= ∂P [ Y = 1] / P [ Y = 1] 
∂W/W 
+ ∂E [ H | Y = 1] / E [ H | Y = 1] 
∂W/W 
. (17) 
This equation shows that the aggregate income elasticity of total labor supply is the sum of extensive margin (partici- 
pation) elasticity and intensive margin (hours worked) elasticity. To consider the two-step decisions of drivers and measure 
the two parts of hourly income elasticity, following the tradition of measuring labor supply elasticity from coeﬃcients in 
estimated log income rate equations, we focus on the “log” version of Eqs. (10) –(12) , i.e., we use log H it instead of H it , and 
log W it instead of W it . Then the regression models are speciﬁed as follows: 
P 
[ 
Y it = 1 | X i 
] 
= 	( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) , (18) 
E [ log H it1 | j = 1] = X 2 i β21 + β2 w 1 log W it + ρσε φ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
. (19) 
E [ log H it0 | j = 0] = X 2 i β20 + β2 w 0 log W it − ρσε φ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
1 − 	( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
. (20) 
Based on the equations above, elasticity at the extensive margin ηp is measured as 4 : 
ηp := ∂P [ Y = 1] / P [ Y = 1] 
∂W/W 
= β1 w φ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
. (21) 
4 In the study of labor supply on Uber’s platform, Chen and Sheldon (2016) measure labor supply elasticity using an IV model without considering 
extensive margin (participation) elasticity. Due to sample self-selection bias, when the two random terms are correlated, their estimated labor supply 
elasticity on the intensive margin will be biased. 
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Elasticity at the intensive margin ηh 1 , given that drivers choose to participate, is measured as: 
ηh 1 = β2 w 1 − β1 w ρσε 
( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) φ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it )	( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	2 ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
− β1 w ρσε φ
2 ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	2 ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
. (22) 
Elasticity at the intensive margin ηh 0 , given that drivers choose to not participate, is measured as: 
ηh 0 = β2 w 0 + β1 w ρσε 
( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) φ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 	( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	
2 
( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
− β1 w ρσε φ
2 ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	
2 
( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
. (23) 
Based on the results above, the aggregate elasticity is measured as: 
η = ηp + ηh 1 
= β1 w φ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
+ 
β2 w 1 − β1 w ρσε ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) φ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it )	( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	2 ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
− β1 w ρσε φ
2 ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
	2 ( X 1 i β1 + β1 w log W it ) 
. (24) 
Estimates of labor supply elasticity on ride-sharing platforms could be biased in the presence of sample self-selection 
and endogeneity. For example, since drivers make participation decision by comparing hourly income rate with their price 
of time at home, any shock that affects the hourly income rate and the price of time at home will induce correlation 
between the error terms in Eqs. (6) and (7) . For this reason, if the correlation is nonzero and the income rate ﬂuctuation 
signiﬁcantly affects drivers’ participation decision (i.e., ρ  = 0 and β1 w  = 0), by Eqs. (22) and (24) , elasticity at the intensive 
margin for participating drivers would be biased if we do not address the sample self-selection problem. In addition, because 
hourly income rates W it are calculated by dividing driver i ’s total daily income on day t by total hours worked on that day 
H it , and hours worked appears in reciprocal form on the right-hand side of Eq. (7) , any measurement error in hours worked 
will induce a negative correlation between hours worked and hourly income rate. As a result, elasticity at the intensive 
margin ηh 1 would be downward biased. Finally, hourly income rates and hours worked conditional on hourly income rates 
may be jointly determined by the same factors. If these factors are unobserved, the coeﬃcient β2 w will be biased due to 
simultaneity bias, which further leads to biased estimates of elasticity at the intensive margin. In the next section, we apply 
an instrumental variable approach based on a large-scale natural experiment to address the endogeneity of hourly income 
rate and reduce the inﬂuence of measurement error in hours worked. 
5. Research design 
5.1. Research context 
The data we use are drawn from Didi Chuxing, the largest mobile transportation platform in China. The platform clocks 
around 30 million ride requests each day and covered 21 million registered drivers in 400 cities in China by 2018. It offers a 
diverse range of transportation services through one mobile app: Premier, Express, Hitch, Taxi, Chauffeur, and so on. In our 
study, we consider the Express service, in which Express drivers act as independent transportation service providers who 
determine their own work schedules. 
We focus on Express service for several reasons. First, Express is the largest service on the platform, which enables us to 
collect accumulative data to study labor supply behavior on the platform. Second, Express service became the dominant ride- 
sharing service in China during the sample period, which separates it from other domestic platforms. Express service as an 
economic version of a private car-hailing service was introduced in May 2015. After one year, in August 2016, the platform 
acquired its biggest competitor in China. Platform competition would have little impact on the variation in labor supply 
during the sample period. Last but foremost, in order to control the nationwide budgets for supply cost, the headquarters 
central team of the platform (not the local team in the city of our dataset) adjusted the driver incentive called income 
multiplier during the sample period 5 . The adjustment is independent and exogenous of the demand and supply status in the 
local market. 
5 In contrast, before the data sample period and the natural experiment, the income multipliers were determined by the city local team. 
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5.2. A Large-scale natural experiment 
5.2.1. Income multiplier 
On ride-sharing platforms, various programs are offered to drivers to encourage them to drive and meet the demand. 
One of the most popular and effective programs is the income multiplier (also called income accelerator ), which increases a 
driver’s trip fare by a multiplier for all trips within a speciﬁed region during speciﬁed time. To be more speciﬁc, let the base 
fare of an order be P , the dynamic pricing factor α ≥1, the commission rate β ∈ (0, 1), and the income multiplier δ ≥1. Then 
the total income for a driver from an order is 
P (1 − β) + P max (α − 1 , δ − 1) , (25) 
where the ﬁrst component is the income minus commission fee and the second component is the maximum of dynamic 
price and income multiplier. In practice, the platform charges its drivers around 20% in a commission fee, i.e., β = 20% , and 
the fare P is normally calculated on a base fare, cost per minute × time in ride, cost per kilometer × ride distance , and booking 
fee , if any. All of these parameters are ﬁxed during the sample period. 
The income multiplier is reminiscent of the well-known dynamic pricing in our context, but they are quite different in 
the following two ways. First, the ﬂuctuation in dynamic pricing factor α changes both price on the passenger side and 
income on the driver side, but the income multiplier only changes income on the driver side, and it has little inﬂuence on 
the number of passenger requests directly. Second, dynamic pricing factor α is contingent on the market supply-demand 
condition and dynamically changes in real time. However, the income multiplier δ is set in advance and then is announced 
to all drivers. Fig. 1 gives an example of the income multiplier on one day. There are ﬁve time windows, including the peak 
hours of 6:30–8:30 am and 17:00–18:30 pm. 
5.2.2. Exogenous shocks in natural experiments 
During our sample period from March 13, to May 21, 2017, in order to control the nationwide budgets for supply cost, 
the headquarters central team of the platform adjusted drivers’ income rate using income multipliers. They did this by 
increasing or decreasing δ, which is independent and exogenous of the demand and supply status in the local market, and 
no local information has been considered to differentiate the adjustment of income multiplier in different cities. During the 
Fig. 1. An Example of an income multiplier. 
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sample period in our dataset, the maximal value of the variable income _ mul tipl ier is 1.55, the minimal value is 1.1, and the 
standard deviation is 0.10, which shows good interday variations of the variable income _ mul tipl ier. 
This policy change creates natural experiments that allow us to assess how changes in income rates affect labor supply 
along both the extensive and intensive margins of drivers. Adjustment of income multipliers was offered only to drivers, and 
thus it had little direct impact on passenger demand. In addition, the adjustment was subject to nationwide budget controls 
and independent of local market condition. All new income multipliers each day were shared in advance with drivers in 
the morning. The income multiplier affected drivers’ labor supply only by changing their income rates, and this exogenous 
shock helps us reduce bias due to the endogeneity problem in the analysis of labor supply. 
5.3. Data description 
5.3.1. Variable description 
Our research design allows us to study the impacts of income rate changes on labor supply in the presence of driver 
heterogeneity. 6 The temporal unit in our analysis is a “day,” but conceptualization of a driver’s workday is challenging. Be- 
cause drivers on ride-sharing platforms can design their work schedules ﬂexibly due to the lack of organizational constraints 
on time, drivers’ labor supply decision needs not resemble a typical workday from 12:00 am to 11:59 pm. For example, in 
informal conversations with drivers, we asked how drivers decided when to begin their shift or workday. Some said they 
would start working at 7:00 am and stop at 8:00 pm, and others said that they would start at 15:00 pm and stop at 04:00 
am the next day to avoid ﬁerce competition in the morning and earn more in the evening. Therefore, an approach that ana- 
lyzes drivers’ working hours per calendar day would split a “workday” that crosses over midnight into two driving sessions. 
In our analysis, we adopt the approach proposed by Chen and Sheldon (2016) to deﬁne a shift as the cluster of all trip and 
online service activities that happens without a break of more than 4 h. Hence, a period of driver inactivity greater than 
four hours marks the beginning of a new shift in our data. 7 Next, we count the number of shifts at each time (in minute) 
and ﬁnd that 4 am is the hour with the lowest number of shifts when drivers are on the road. Finally, considering the daily 
adjustment of income multipliers, we deﬁne a “day” as the collection of all time during the 24-hour period between 4:00 
am one day and 3:59 am the next. 
A driver’s hourly income rate is deﬁned as the ratio of total daily income to daily hours worked. The underlying as- 
sumption is that there is an hourly income rate characterizing a working day that a driver can use to make her/his decision 
on hours worked. Camerer et al. (1997) , followed by Sheldon (2016) , suggest conducting an autocorrelation analysis to test 
this assumption. If the autocorrelation is negative, drivers may stop working early when the hourly income rate is high, 
because high hourly income rates are likely to be followed by low-wage hours. This labor supply behavior due to nega- 
tive autocorrelation could lead to misunderstanding that drivers were making decision with income targets ( Camerer et al., 
1997 ). Therefore, understanding the time-series properties of the hourly income rates within a day is important in under- 
standing what drivers might infer from income rate in the current hour about income rates during the remaining of the 
day ( Farber, 2005 ). We conduct an autocorrelation analysis on within-day income rate by each clock hour. The results show 
that the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is positive (0.602) and signiﬁcantly different from zero, suggesting that when the hourly 
income rates are high, they will probably continue to be high in the next period, which also indicates that the within-shift 
hourly earnings are relatively stable ( Sheldon, 2016 ). 
To capture observed driver heterogeneity, the vector X of control variables includes a number of time-invariant driver- 
speciﬁc variables: age demographics ( age i ) and gender ( gender i ). In addition, to account for the learning-by-doing effect 
and capture driver-speciﬁc heterogeneity in experience, the vector X also contains work experience ( experience it ), mea- 
sured by the number of days between the day of qualifying to work on the platform and current day t . To capture tem- 
poral variation in preference for driving, X includes 6 dummies for day of week (i.e., Monday t = 1 if day t is on Mon- 
day; otherwise, Monday t = 0 ). Finally, the vector X includes a number of weather-related variables, such as the highest 
temperature ( temperature t ), the highest precipitation within 24 hours ( intensity t ), and PM 2.5 level as an air quality index 
( pm 25 t ). 
5.4. Driver classiﬁcation along extensive and intensive margins 
Based on the evidence regarding driver heterogeneity, we present a two-dimensional scheme to classify drivers. As sug- 
gested by standard labor economics theory, income rates exert two distinct effects on labor supply by inﬂuencing two 
margins: one is at the intensive margin and refers to the number of hours worked; the other is at the extensive margin 
and refers to the decision to participate or not in the labor market ( Cahuc et al., 2014 ). Therefore, as shown in Table 2 , we 
classify drivers based on the total number of days worked (extensive margin) and the average daily hours worked (intensive 
margin) in the past 30 working days. 8 
6 The results in this paper are made using proprietary data that cannot be released. However, we do indicate levels of signiﬁcance where appropriate. 
7 Farber (2015) deﬁnes any gap between trips of more than 6 hours (more than 360 min) as marking the end of one shift and the beginning of the next. 
8 Cut-off values for classifying drivers are anonymized. 
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Table 2 
Driver classiﬁcation along extensive and intensive margins. 
Percentage of observations in each Group Working hours per day 
High Intermediate Low 
Working days within 30 days 
High (I) 15.919% (IV) 20.147% (VII) 10.649% 
Intermediate (II) 1.592% (V) 7.142% (VIII) 9.855% 
Low (III) 1.095% (VI) 4.612% (IX) 28.989% 
5.5. Empirical analysis 
5.5.1. Basic model 
We ﬁrst use an ordinary linear regression model (OLS) given in Eq. (26) to examine the working hours of drivers at 
different hourly income levels. Camerer et al. (1997) estimate the regression and interpreted β2,1 as the elasticity of labor 
supply. They show that estimates of working-hour elasticity are strongly negative, and explain that drivers set a daily income 
target and quit working once they reach it. 
OLS: 
log (W orking _ hours it ) = β2 , 0 + β2 , 1 log (income _ rate it ) + β2 , 2 age i + β2 , 3 gender i + β2 , 4 experience it 
+ β2 , 5 temperature t + β2 , 6 intensity t + β2 , 7 pm 25 t + β2 , 8 Monday t + β2 , 9 T uesd ay t + β2 , 10 W ed nesd ay t 
+ β2 , 11 T hur sday t + β2 , 12 F r iday t + β2 , 13 Saturday t + ε it (26) 
Farber (2005) recognizes an important conceptual problem and an important econometric problem with this model. First, 
he points out that the OLS model relies on there being signiﬁcant exogenous day-to-day variation in average income, which 
drives the estimate of labor supply elasticity β2,1 in Eq. (26) . However, his/her empirical analysis shows that there is no 
signiﬁcant interday variation in average income and no autocorrelation in hourly income rate on a particular day. Second, 
Camerer et al. (1997) notice that any measurement error in W orking _ hours it would bias the estimate of β2,1 downward, 
so they instrument the variable income _ rate it with the average income rate for other drivers on the same calendar date. 
However, Farber (2005) suggests that there might be day-speciﬁc factors correlated with both drivers’ hourly income rate 
and working hours conditional on the hourly income rate, and other drivers’ average hourly income rate were invalid as IV 
to estimate the causal effect of income rates on working hours. 
In the natural experiment during our sample period, the platform adjusted the income multiplier daily due to budget 
controls, and announced it publicly in the early morning. This created exogenous day-to-day variation in drivers’ average 
hourly income rate and helps us identify our models, which we discuss in Section 5.5.3 . 
5.5.2. Considering potential sample selection bias 
On ride-sharing platforms, drivers face a two-step decision: whether to participate in work, and if so, how many hours 
to work. As discussed in Section 4.1 , if some factors can affect both the participation decision and hours worked, then OLS 
estimates of parameters in Eq. (26) actually ﬁt on the nonrandomly selected samples and lead to sample self-selection bias. 
The appropriate econometric technique for such a scenario is to model self-selection of labor force participation as presented 
in Section 4.1.1 . Accordingly, we add to our original Eq. (26) one more Selection Equation that describes drivers’ participation 
choice. Our Heckman two-step model speciﬁcation is: 
Selection equation: 
P 
[ 
P articipate it = 1 
] 
= 	(β1 , 0 + β1 , 1 log (a v g _ last7 _ income _ rate it ) + β1 , 2 age i + β1 , 3 gender i + β1 , 4 experience it 
+ β1 , 5 temperature t + β1 , 6 intensity t + β1 , 7 pm 25 t 
+ β1 , 8 Monday t + β1 , 9 T uesday t + β1 , 10 W ednesday t 
+ β1 , 11 T hur sday t + β1 , 12 F r iday t + β1 , 13 Saturday t ) (27) 
Outcome equation: 
log (W orking _ hours it ) = β2 , 0 + β2 , 1 log (income _ rate it ) + β2 , 2 age i + β2 , 3 gender i + β2 , 4 experience it 
+ β2 , 5 temperature t + β2 , 6 intensity t + β2 , 7 pm 25 t + β2 , 8 Monday t + β2 , 9 T uesd ay t + β2 , 10 W ed nesd ay t 
+ β2 , 11 T hur sday t + β2 , 12 F r iday t + β2 , 13 Saturday t + ε it (28) 
In this study, we estimate the income rate elasticities of daily participation probabilities and daily hours worked using 
the Heckman sample selection two-step model described in Section 4.2 that controls for self-selection bias. In the Outcome 
Equation, the variable income _ rate it is deﬁned as the ratio of the observed total daily income that a driver i receives on a 
working day t to daily hours worked. In the Selection Equation, ideally, we should estimate the Probit model of participation 
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by using the same variable income _ rate it , however, driver i does not receive her/his income on day t when making the 
participation decision, and it is also impossible to observe the variable income _ rate it if the driver i does not participate 
on day t . Therefore, we estimate the Probit model of participation by replacing the observed hourly income rates with 
a v g _ last7 _ income _ rate it , which is deﬁned as the average hourly income rate of driver i during her/his last seven working 
days that she/he participated before day t . The last seven working days may be within a week, e.g., for full-time drivers, 
or may fall in multiple weeks, e.g., for part-time drivers. The mean of relative difference of a v g _ last7 _ income _ rate it and 
income _ rate it is between −5% and 3% across participating drivers in the 9 driver groups and days during the sample period, 
which shows a good approximation of a v g _ last7 _ income _ rate it as driver’s perception of hourly income rate. 
5.5.3. Identiﬁcation of the outcome equation 
In Selection Eq. (27) , drivers’ participation decision “happens” after the realization of average income rates during the last 
seven working days. However, in Outcome Eq. (28) , drivers’ working hours are not determined right after obtaining ﬁxed 
income rates, because working hours also have effects on income rates. This simultaneity bias creates an endogeneity prob- 
lem in model identiﬁcation. Moreover, we analyze labor supply using observed hourly income rates calculated by dividing 
total daily income by total hours worked. Hence any measurement error in hours worked will induce a negative correlation 
between hours worked and hourly income rate. As a result, elasticity at the intensive margin would be downward biased. To 
address the measurement error in hours worked and endogeneity issue between hourly income rate and working hours, we 
adopt the IV 2SLS approach as our identiﬁcation strategy, as introduced in Section 4.1.2 . A valid instrument should satisfy 
relevance and exclusion restriction assumptions: (1) it should be correlated with the endogenous regressor (i.e., relevance 
condition); (2) it should be uncorrelated with the error term (i.e., exclusion restriction condition) and inﬂuence the outcome 
(i.e., hours worked) only through the endogenous variable (i.e., hourly income rate). 
We propose two types of instruments. First, we employ the exogenous shock created by the natural experiments in 
our study period by creating the variable income _ mul tipl ier t . Given that the income multiplier is time-varying, we use the 
daily income multiplier that affects the greatest number of drivers as IV, which is the multiplier during evening peak hours 
17:00–18:29 pm on day t . First, the multipliers during morning peak hours 7:00–8:29 am and during evening peak hours 
17:00–18:29 pm are equal in most days and their difference is always less than 0.1 in the dataset; Second, we ﬁnd that the 
proportions of working hours for drivers during 17:00–18:29 pm are very similar for all 9 driver groups (e.g., 13.74–16.59%). 
In addition, the standard deviation of hours worked during peak hours is small for each driver group (e.g., 0.86–1.60), which 
indicates the relative homogeneity among drivers within each group. Therefore, although the treatment effect of the income 
multiplier on drivers labor supply is heterogeneous for each individual, we focus on the average effect for each group. By the 
total income Eq. (25) for a driver from an order, variable income _ mul tipl ier t reﬂects the impact of exogenous driver income 
on hours worked, satisfying the relevance condition. Admittedly, this IV estimates the average causal effect of treatment on 
the subpopulation of compliers. By the local average treatment effect theorem ( Imbens and Angrist, 1994 ), the treatment 
effect identiﬁed is an average for those (“compliers”) who can be induced to change hours worked by a change in the 
instrument. For those who never work during peak hours when the income multiplier incentive is offered, without any 
further assumption, the local average treatment effect is not informative ( Angrist and Pischke, 2008 ). 
Following Oettinger (1999) , we supplement our analysis by adding another IV, the logarithm of number of passenger 
requests on day t (i.e., request t ) as one shifter of demand for driver supply. Although traditional taxi data cannot track total 
potential demand and can only record satisﬁed demand, the total potential demand is available on the ride-sharing platform. 
Note that the number of passenger requests used as IV is not the number of passengers who choose to send out requests 
for ride. It is the real potential demand, deﬁned as the number of passengers who open the mobile app and indicate their 
origins and destinations before receiving estimation of waiting time and deciding whether to send out requests. The same 
instrumental variable is also used in Castillo et al. (2018) as demand shifts, where the endogenous pickup time determined 
in equilibrium is instrumented using the number of people who open the Uber app since market outcomes in no way in- 
ﬂuence whether people open the app or not, which has the same logic as our model. Although drivers may be aware of the 
demand peaks and surging prices during some speciﬁc hours within a day, it is diﬃcult for them to predict the total pas- 
senger requests and income levels in a new day. Also, the temporal patterns of demand within a day could be similar across 
days, hence the awareness of the patterns of peak/non-peak hours within a day cannot help drivers to gain much valuable 
information on the income level in a new day. In this paper, we do not study the within-day working hour shifts for drivers. 
The number of passenger requests affects the working decisions of drivers, through the channel of affecting the hourly in- 
come rate. These two instrumental variables, income _ mul tipl ier t and request t , are correlated with hourly income rate but are 
not directly correlated with the measurement of hours worked, which also helps us reduce the inﬂuence of measurement 
error in hours worked. With the two IVs, we employ the 2SLS estimation procedure introduced in Section 4.1.2 and further 
provide relevant statistical tests to show that these instrumental variables are valid in Section 6.1 . 
6. Results and discussion 
In this section, we discuss our results and summarize important ﬁndings. We show that both sample selection bias and 
endogeneity bias exist, which indicates that some unobservable factors indeed affect drivers’ choices regarding participation 
and hours worked. Considering that the impact of hourly income rate on labor supply varies across different groups of 
drivers, we also include driver-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects to further control for driver heterogeneity. 
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Table 3 
Estimation results for group I (Drivers with high extensive margin and high intensive margin). 
Variables (1) OLS (2) Heckman model without IVs (3) Heckman model with IVs (4) Outcome 
equation with 
ﬁxed effects Selection 
equation 
Outcome 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
Outcome 
equation 
( Intercept ) 1 .467 ∗∗∗ −0 .785 ∗∗∗ 1 .276 ∗∗∗ 2 .854 ∗∗∗ 1 .696 ∗∗∗
log(income_rate) 0 .204 ∗∗∗ 0 .217 ∗∗∗ 0 .152 ∗∗∗ 0 .111 ∗∗∗
log(avg_last7_income_rate) 0 .326 ∗∗∗ 0 .310 ∗∗∗
log (request) −0 .699 ∗∗∗
income _ mul tipl ier −0 .514 ∗∗∗
age 0 .002 ∗∗∗ 0 .012 ∗∗∗ 0 .003 ∗∗∗ 0 .012 ∗∗∗ 0 .002 ∗∗∗ 0 .001 ∗∗∗
gender 0 .008 ∗ 0 .078 ∗∗∗ 0 .018 ∗∗∗ 0 .078 ∗∗∗ 0 .007. 0 .002 
experience −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗ −0 .0 0 0. 
temperature −0 .001 ∗∗∗ −0 .002 ∗∗∗ −0 .001 ∗∗∗ 0 .0 0 0 −0 .001 ∗∗∗ −0 .001 ∗∗∗
intensity −0 .015 ∗∗∗ 0 .060 ∗∗∗ −0 .009 ∗ 0 .190 ∗∗∗ −0 .017 ∗∗∗ −0 .012 ∗∗∗
pm25 −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .001 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .001 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗
Monday 0 .001 0 .007 0 .002 −0 .119 ∗∗∗ −0 .002 −0 .003 
Tuesday −0 .007 ∗∗ 0 .033 ∗∗∗ −0 .003 −0 .093 ∗∗∗ −0 .011 ∗∗∗ −0 .012 ∗∗∗
Wednesday 0 .011 ∗∗∗ 0 .164 ∗∗∗ 0 .030 ∗∗∗ −0 .001 0 .001 0 .002 
Thursday 0 .013 ∗∗∗ 0 .198 ∗∗∗ 0 .035 ∗∗∗ 0 .043 ∗∗∗ 0 .002 0 .004 
Friday 0 .023 ∗∗∗ 0 .210 ∗∗∗ 0 .045 ∗∗∗ 0 .208 ∗∗∗ 0 .014 ∗∗∗ 0 .019 ∗∗∗
Saturday 0 .022 ∗∗∗ 0 .108 ∗∗∗ 0 .034 ∗∗∗ 0 .192 ∗∗∗ 0 .019 ∗∗∗ 0 .022 ∗∗∗
invMillsRatio 0 .259 ∗∗∗ −0 .092 ∗∗∗ −0 .046 ∗∗
Weak instruments ( p-value ) < 2 e − 16 ∗∗∗
Wu-Hausman ( p-value ) < 2 e − 16 ∗∗∗
(a). Signiﬁcant at 0.1; ∗ signiﬁcant at 0.05; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.01; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.001. 
In Section 6.1 , we compare the estimation results of OLS, the Heckman two-step sample selection model without IVs, and 
the Heckman two-step sample selection model with IVs in Section 6.1.1 . These results shed light on the sample selection 
bias and endogeneity bias. Next, we evaluate the validity of two instrumental variables by conducting statistical tests in 
Section 6.1.2 . In Section 6.2 , based on the framework proposed in Section 4 , we present and discuss the estimation results 
of labor supply elasticity along both the extensive and intensive margins. In Section 6.3 , we present estimation results by 
age and gender. 
6.1. Model estimation 
6.1.1. Evidence of sample selection and endogeneity bias 
As discussed in Section 4.2 , we estimate driver participation and hours worked jointly while accounting for sample self- 
selection bias and endogeneity. Taking Group I and Group IX as examples, Tables 3 and 4 summarize the results of different 
model speciﬁcations. First, we estimate OLS Eq. (26) without accounting for the sample self-selection and endogeneity, 
which is similar to the OLS speciﬁcation in Camerer et al. (1997) using observed hourly income rate directly. The results of 
OLS show that the coeﬃcients of variable log(income _ rate ) are positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero. Second, we esti- 
mate the Heckman two-step model without IVs considering sample self-selection bias using Selection Eq. (27) and Outcome 
Eq. (28) . The estimation results of Heckman model without IVs show that the coeﬃcients of log(a v g _ last7 _ income _ rate ) in 
the Selection Equation are positive, which implies that participation probability increases as the income rate increases. The 
coeﬃcients of the selectivity-corrected log(income _ rate ) in Outcome Eq. (28) are also positive, which is consistent with the 
neoclassical labor supply model. More importantly, the coeﬃcients of the inverse Mills ratio invMillsRatio are signiﬁcantly 
different from zero, which implies the existence of sample selection bias. Third, taking the endogeneity of the hourly in- 
come rates into consideration, we build on Heckman Model without IVs and control the bias by instrumenting income _ rate 
using income _ mul tipl ier and request . The estimation results of Heckman model with IVs show that both the coeﬃcients of 
the hourly income rates log(a v g _ last7 _ income _ rate ) in the Selection Equation and the coeﬃcients of the selectivity-corrected 
log(income _ rate ) in the Outcome Equation are positive and signiﬁcant. More importantly, we ﬁnd evidence for endogeneity 
of the hourly income rates income _ rate it (the results of Wu-Hausman test are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the signiﬁ- 
cance level α = 0 . 05 ), thus reject the null hypothesis that the treatment variable is exogenous with respect to hours worked. 
Again, the coeﬃcients of the inverse Mills ratio invMillsRatio are signiﬁcantly different from zero, which conﬁrms the exis- 
tence of sample selection bias. In addition, the coeﬃcients of the inverse Mills ratio invMillsRatio are signiﬁcantly negative, 
therefore, by Eq. (11) , the working hours of drivers that choose to participate are less than average working hours. If sample 
selection bias is not taken into consideration, working-hour elasticity at the intensive margin, given that drivers choose to 
participate, would be biased. Finally, we include driver-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects to control for all time-invariant aspects of each 
driver and day-speciﬁc ﬁxed effects to control for all individual-invariant aspects F it in Outcome Eq. (28) . The estimation 
results of Outcome Equation with ﬁxed effects show that the inclusion of individual and daily ﬁxed effects does not change 
our estimates signiﬁcantly, which ensures the robustness of our results. 
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Table 4 
Estimation results for group IX (Drivers with low extensive margin and low intensive margin). 
Variables (1) OLS (2) Heckman model without IVs (3) Heckman model with IVs (4) Outcome 
equation with 
ﬁxed effects Selection 
equation 
Outcome 
equation 
Selection 
equation 
Outcome 
equation 
( Intercept ) 0 .319 ∗∗∗ −2 .458 ∗∗∗ 1 .531 ∗∗∗ −2 .300 ∗∗∗ 0 .247 
log(income_rate) 0 .163 ∗∗∗ 0 .137 ∗∗∗ 0 .367 ∗∗ 0 .512 ∗
log(avg_last7_income_rate) 0 .260 ∗∗∗ 0 .260 ∗∗∗
log (request) 0 .037 
income _ mul tipl ier −0 .244 ∗∗∗
age −0 .0 0 0 0 .003 ∗∗∗ −0 .001. 0 .003 ∗∗∗ −0 .001 −0 .0 0 0 
gender 0 .042 0 .045 ∗ 0 .018 0 .045 ∗ 0 .022 0 .011 
experience −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0 .0 0 0 
temperature −0 .004 ∗∗∗ −0 .003 ∗∗∗ −0 .003 ∗ −0 .003 ∗∗∗ −0 .004 ∗∗ −0 .006 ∗
intensity 0 .006 0 .074 ∗∗ −0 .027 0 .080 ∗∗∗ −0 .014 −0 .046 
pm25 −0 .0 0 0 ∗ −0 .0 0 0 −0 .0 0 0. −0 .0 0 0 −0 .0 0 0. −0 .0 0 0 
Monday −0 .016 −0 .028 ∗ −0 .008 −0 .041 ∗∗ 0 .003 0 .062 
Tuesday −0 .029 0 .012 −0 .036 0 .001 −0 .019 0 .005 
Wednesday −0 .007 −0 .004 −0 .007 −0 .011 0 .020 0 .058 
Thursday −0 .005 −0 .011 −0 .0 0 0 −0 .021 0 .016 0 .060 
Friday −0 .025 0 .079 ∗∗∗ −0 .058 ∗ 0 .061 ∗∗∗ −0 .044. −0 .056 
Saturday 0 .011 0 .065 ∗∗∗ −0 .016 0 .072 ∗∗∗ −0 .010 −0 .010 
invMillsRatio −0 .549 ∗∗∗ −0 .281. −0 .358 
Weak instruments ( p-value ) < 2 e − 16 ∗∗∗
Wu-Hausman ( p-value ) 0 .045 ∗
(a). Signiﬁcant at 0.1; ∗ signiﬁcant at 0.05; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.01; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.001. 
6.1.2. Validity of instrumental variables 
To evaluate the validity of the instruments (i.e., income _ mul tipl ier and request ) and ensure asymptotic consistency of 
IV estimators, we check both the relevance condition and the exclusion restriction condition. In terms of the relevance 
condition, in order to know whether the instruments (i.e., income _ mul tipl ier and request ) explain a suﬃcient amount of 
variation in income _ rate, we perform a weak identiﬁcation test by encompassing an F-test for the joint signiﬁcance of the 
ﬁrst-stage regression, yielding the F -statistics of 1934 for Group I and 70.62 for Group IX with an extremely low p -value. 
These F-statistics are well above the suggested rule of thumb for weak instruments ( Staiger and Stock, 1997 ), indicating that 
our IVs combined are not weak and should satisfy the relevance condition. 
To further evaluate the validity of the instrument variables and check the exclusion restriction condition, we conduct 
a set of Hausman tests as introduced in Guevara (2018) . Speciﬁcally, one model is estimated using the two instruments 
( income _ mul tipl ier and request ), and two models are estimated using only one instrument ( income _ mul tipl ier or request ). 
Under the null hypothesis, both instruments are exogenous and the estimators are consistent, and therefore generate similar 
results; the estimator ˆ β2 obtained from the model using two instruments are more eﬃcient because it makes use of more 
information ( Guevara, 2018 ). Under the alternative hypothesis, if one of the two instrumental variables is endogenous, the 
estimator ˆ β2 will be different from the estimator ˆ β1 obtained from the model using only one instrumental variable. The 
statistic S HAU of the HAU test is distributed Chi-square with degree 1 and is deﬁned as 
S HAU = ( ˆ  β1 − ˆ β2 ) ′ ( ˆ β1 −  ˆ β2 ) 
−1 ( ˆ  β1 − ˆ β2 ) ∼ χ2 df , (29) 
where  ˆ β2 
is the variance-covariance matrix of the estimators of the eﬃcient model (the one using two instrumental vari- 
ables), and  ˆ β1 
is the one obtained using only one instrumental variable. Take Group I as an example, comparing results in 
Tables 3 and 5 , we ﬁnd that ˆ β2 and two ˆ β1 are similar. In the Probit Selection Equation, the coeﬃcient estimator of the vari- 
able log(a v g _ last7 _ income _ rate ) is 0.310, 0.312, and 0.324, respectively. In the Outcome Equation, the coeﬃcient estimator of 
the variable log(income _ rate ) is 0.152, 0.156, and 0.119, respectively. In addition, the results of Hausman test for Group I is 
shown in the last row in Table 5 . The p -values of the HAU test are 1, which means that we do not reject the null hypothesis 
of the validity of the two instrumental variables. Similar results can be found for all other driver groups at a signiﬁcance 
level α = 0 . 01 , which provide evidence to support the exogeneity of these instruments. 
6.2. Estimates of labor supply elasticity in the presence of driver heterogeneity 
Based on the estimates of Outcome Equation with ﬁxed effects, we summarize labor supply elasticities along both the 
extensive and intensive margins in Table 6 . Due to sample selection bias, elasticity ηh 1 for participating drivers is different 
from elasticity ηh 0 for non-participating drivers at the intensive margin. Interestingly, participation elasticity ηp at the ex- 
tensive margin, which ranges from 0.107 to 0.524, decreases along both the extensive (e.g., Group I < Group II < Group 
III) and intensive margins (e.g., Group I < Group IV < Group VII); working-hour elasticity for participating drivers at the 
intensive margin ηh 1 , which ranges from 0.023 to 1.037, decreases along the intensive margin (e.g., Group I < Group IV < 
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Table 5 
Estimation results of alternative model speciﬁcation for group I (Drivers with high extensive margin and high intensive margin). 
Variables Heckman model with request as an IV Heckman model with income _ mul tipl ier as an IV 
Selection equation Outcome equation Selection equation Outcome equation 
(Intercept) 2.206 ∗∗∗ 1.667 ∗∗∗ −0.100 1.884 ∗∗∗
log(income_rate) 0.156 ∗∗∗ 0.119 ∗∗∗
log(avg_last7_income_rate) 0.312 ∗∗∗ 0.324 ∗∗∗
log (request) −0.703 ∗∗∗
income _ mul tipl ier −0.529 ∗∗∗
Age 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.002 ∗∗∗ 0.012 ∗∗∗ 0.001 ∗∗∗
Gender 0.079 ∗∗∗ 0.007 ∗ 0.077 ∗∗∗ 0.003 
Experience −0.0 0 0 ∗∗ −0.0 0 0 ∗ −0.0 0 0 ∗∗ −0.0 0 0 
Temperature 0.001 −0.001 ∗∗∗ −0.003 ∗∗∗ −0.0 0 0 ∗
Intensity 0.162 ∗∗∗ −0.016 ∗∗∗ 0.088 ∗∗∗ −0.019 ∗∗∗
pm25 −0.001 ∗∗∗ −0.0 0 0 ∗∗∗ −0.001 ∗∗∗ −0.0 0 0 
Monday −0.083 ∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.030 ∗∗∗ −0.004. 
Tuesday −0.062 ∗∗∗ −0.011 ∗∗∗ −0.0 0 0 −0.015 ∗∗∗
Wednesday 0.028 ∗∗∗ 0.003 0.134 ∗∗∗ −0.012 ∗∗
Thursday 0.078 ∗∗∗ 0.005. 0.161 ∗∗∗ −0.011 ∗∗
Friday 0.242 ∗∗∗ 0.017 ∗∗∗ 0.176 ∗∗∗ 0.002 
Saturday 0.167 ∗∗∗ 0.020 ∗∗∗ 0.134 ∗∗∗ 0.013 ∗∗∗
invMillsRatio −0.064 ∗∗∗ −0.226 ∗∗∗
Weak instruments ( p -value) < 2 e − 16 ∗∗∗ < 2 e − 16 ∗∗∗
Wu-Hausman ( p -value) < 2 e − 16 ∗∗∗ < 2 e − 16 ∗∗∗
HAU test ( p -value) 1 1 
(a). Signiﬁcant at 0.1; ∗ signiﬁcant at 0.05; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.01; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.001. 
Table 6 
Summary of labor supply elasticities. 
Group Estimation Supply elasticity Aggregate elasticity 
β1 w β2 w ηp ηh 1 ηh 0 ληh 1 + (1 − λ) ηh 0 η
I 0.310 0.111 0.107 0.117 0.122 0.118 0.224 
II 0.124 0.109 0.113 0.100 0.101 0.101 0.213 
III 0.238 0.066 0.206 0.023 0.034 0.029 0.229 
IV 0.342 0.352 0.163 0.362 0.367 0.364 0.525 
V 0.257 0.249 0.203 0.235 0.237 0.236 0.438 
VI 0.185 0.248 0.225 0.195 0.226 0.216 0.420 
VII 0.421 0.852 0.275 1.037 1.065 1.048 1.312 
VIII 0.368 0.860 0.488 1.023 0.950 0.967 1.512 
IX 0.260 0.512 0.524 0.600 0.531 0.535 1.124 
(a) λ is the average percentage of drivers who choose to participate on each day. 
Group VII). Finally, the aggregate elasticity η also decreases along the intensive margin (e.g., Group I < Group IV < Group 
VII). 
In summary, the estimated positive income rate elasticities of labor supply show that the labor supply along both the 
extensive and intensive margins on the ride-sharing platform responds positively to a change in the hourly income rates in 
the dataset. The results do not completely exclude the possible existence of drivers’ income targeting behavior. They imply 
that, when the average driver makes daily labor supply decision with the practical income levels in our dataset, the behavior 
forces in favor of neoclassical intertemporal substitution outweigh the forces that work based on income targets (also see 
Fehr and Goette, 2007; Stafford, 2015 ). 
Considering that the time period (e.g., hour, day, week, month, and year) is very important in drivers’ strategic and/or 
tactic labor supply behavior, and the deﬁnition of time scale/unit (again, hour, day, week, month, and year) in the model 
may affect the results, we also conduct another set of models using week as time unit to explore the weekly labor supply re- 
sponse that accounts both participation and working-hour decisions. The results are statistically signiﬁcant and qualitatively 
consistent with the results obtained from the models using day as time unit. 
6.3. Labor supply in subgroups 
To further investigate the impact of hourly income rate on labor supply, we estimate labor supply elasticities in different 
subgroups of drivers. Table 7 summarizes estimates for male and female drivers. We ﬁnd that a higher hourly income rate 
can signiﬁcantly increase male drivers’ labor supply in all groups, and the decrease in participation elasticity along both 
extensive and intensive margins still holds for male drivers. However, the effect of hourly income rate on hours worked 
for female drivers is not signiﬁcant. One possible explanation is the low proportion of female drivers on the ride-sharing 
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Table 7 
Supply elasticities of male and female drivers. 
Group Male Female 
Elasticity ηp ηh 1 η ηp ηh 1 η
I 0.108 ∗∗∗ 0.118 ∗∗∗ 0.226 0.046. 0.130 ∗ 0.177 
II 0.135 ∗∗∗ 0.089 ∗∗ 0.224 −0.469 ∗∗ −0.039 −0.508 
III 0.212 ∗∗∗ 0.015 0.228 0.113 0.459 0.572 
IV 0.160 ∗∗∗ 0.342 ∗∗∗ 0.501 0.238 ∗∗∗ 0.307 ∗∗∗ 0.545 
V 0.200 ∗∗∗ 0.306 ∗∗∗ 0.506 0.252 ∗∗∗ −0.403 −0.151 
VI 0.220 ∗∗∗ 0.184 ∗∗∗ 0.403 0.318 ∗∗ 0.588 ∗ 0.906 
VII 0.275 ∗∗∗ 0.980 ∗∗∗ 1.255 0.262 ∗∗∗ 1.014 ∗∗∗ 1.275 
VIII 0.485 ∗∗∗ 1.013 ∗∗∗ 1.498 0.562 ∗∗∗ 1.462 ∗∗ 2.024 
IX 0.526 ∗∗∗ 0.480. 0.975 0.482 ∗∗∗ 0.716 ∗∗∗ 0.648 
(a). Signiﬁcant at 0.1; ∗ signiﬁcant at 0.05; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.01; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 
0.001. These are the signiﬁcance levels for estimates of βw . 
Table 8 
Supply elasticities of drivers in different age groups. 
Group Youth Middle-aged Senior 
Elasticity ηp ηh 1 η ηp ηh 1 η ηp ηh 1 η
I 0.101 ∗∗∗ 0.056 ∗∗ 0.157 0.102 ∗∗∗ 0.105 ∗∗∗ 0.207 0.109 ∗∗∗ 0.146 ∗∗∗ 0.255 
II 0.127 ∗ 0.168 ∗∗ 0.295 0.088 ∗ 0.041 0.129 0.161 ∗ −0.048 0.113 
III 0.317 ∗∗∗ −0.020 0.297 0.165 ∗∗∗ −0.0 0 0 0.165 0.013 −0.065 −0.052 
IV 0.180 ∗∗∗ 0.373 ∗∗∗ 0.553 0.151 ∗∗∗ 0.333 ∗∗∗ 0.484 0.159 ∗∗∗ 0.305 ∗∗∗ 0.463 
V 0.145 ∗∗∗ 0.292 ∗∗ 0.437 0.234 ∗∗∗ 0.313 ∗∗∗ 0.547 0.215 ∗∗∗ 0.323 ∗∗ 0.538 
VI 0.217 ∗∗∗ 0.305 ∗∗ 0.522 0.277 ∗∗∗ −0.002 0.275 0.010 0.221 0.232 
VII 0.259 ∗∗∗ 1.103 ∗∗∗ 1.362 0.300 ∗∗∗ 0.974 ∗∗∗ 1.274 0.225 ∗∗∗ 0.918 ∗∗∗ 1.143 
VIII 0.500 ∗∗∗ 0.815 ∗∗∗ 1.315 0.481 ∗∗∗ 1.158 ∗∗∗ 1.639 0.471 ∗∗∗ 0.788 ∗∗∗ 1.259 
IX 0.520 ∗∗∗ 0.533 1.054 0.525 ∗∗∗ 0.475 ∗∗∗ 1.0 0 0 0.517 ∗∗∗ 1.024 ∗∗∗ 1.335 
(a). Signiﬁcant at 0.1; ∗ signiﬁcant at 0.05; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.01; ∗∗∗ signiﬁcant at 0.001. These are the signiﬁcance 
levels for estimates of βw . 
platform, which leads to smaller sample size in each group. Table 8 presents the labor supply elasticities of drivers in 
different age groups and reveals that labor supply elasticity is affected by driver age. There is also no evidence of negative 
elasticities in all age groups. 
7. Conclusion 
We evaluate the impacts of hourly income rate on daily labor supply of drivers on ride-sharing platforms. First, we 
propose an econometric framework to estimate the income rate elasticity of participation and working-hour, which considers 
the sample self-selection bias of labor force participation and the endogeneity of hourly income rate. Next, taking advantage 
of a natural experiment to create exogenous shocks, we empirically analyze the impacts of hourly income rate on labor 
supply along both the extensive and intensive margins by instrumenting endogenous hourly income rate with the driver 
income multiplier. We estimate both the extensive margin elasticity and the intensive margin elasticity of labor supply 
on a ride-sharing platform using a framework that controls for sample self-selection bias, endogeneity of the income rate, 
and measurement error in hours, in the context of a natural experiment. The estimated results reveal that when the average 
driver makes daily labor supply decision on ride-sharing platforms, the behavior forces in favor of neoclassical intertemporal 
substitution outweigh the forces that work based on income targets. In particular, using the dataset from the ride-sharing 
platform, we ﬁnd that participation elasticity ranges from 0.107 to 0.524, and working-hour elasticity ranges from 0.023 to 
1.037. Interestingly, in the presence of driver heterogeneity, we ﬁnd that in general participation elasticity decreases along 
the extensive margin (number of working days) and along the intensive margin (number of working hours per day), and 
working-hour elasticity decreases along intensive margin. 
It is important to take into account the limitations of our ﬁndings. First, although we propose a model to describe the 
effects of hourly income rate on labor supply, it dose not yield the optimal participation and working-hour decision for 
drivers. An interesting avenue for future research would be to create a theoretical model to jointly analyze decisions on 
daily participation and hours worked. Second, we employed instrumental variables to address the endogeneity issue of in- 
come rate, but the treatment effect identiﬁed is an average for those treated. Therefore, it would be desirable to design 
randomized control experiments to further evaluate the heterogeneous treatment effects of income rates on labor sup- 
ply of drivers. Finally, because of data limitations, our study does not examine the impact of other factors, such as multi- 
homing behavior in platform competition and social interaction among drivers. These factors would be worth studying in the 
future. 
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